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Abstract
Human natural face-to-face communication is characterized by inter-personal coordination. In this paper, phenomena
are analyzed that yield coordination of behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes between interaction partners, which can be
tied to a concept of establishing social resonance. It is discussed whether these mechanisms can and should be
transferred to conversation with artificial interlocutors like ECAs or humanoid robots. It is argued that one major step
in this direction is embodied coordination, mutual adaptations that are mediated by flexible modules for the top-down
production and bottom-up perception of expressive conversational behavior that ground in and, crucially, coalesce in
the same sensorimotor structures. Work on modeling this for ECAs with a focus on coverbal gestures is presented.
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1. Introduction
Computer systems that figure in humanoid form, ei-
ther as robots or as virtual characters, increasingly meet
their users as artificial interlocutors. As so-called Em-
bodied Conversational Agents (ECAs) they embody
(part of) the user interface to allow humans to inter-
act with a machine as if having a face-to-face conver-
sation with another human (Cassell et al., 2000b). Such
agents can be found nowadays as assistants to desktop
interfaces, as chatbots on websites, as tutors in educa-
tion environments, or as humanoid robots that shall as-
sist in household tasks. They are equipped with abili-
ties for using natural language, conducting dialog, ex-
pression emotions, or nonverbal behavior. However,
they commonly rely on the classical conduit metaphor
of communication (Reddy, 1979): user and agent are
taking turns to produce (encode) and receive (decode)
meaning-carrying messages that travel across channels
between them. As has often been attested (e.g. Scheflen
(1982); Ga¨rdenfors (1996)), this “message ping-pong”
is an insufficient model of human conversation. Among
other things, it cannot account for all those dynamic
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interactions that interlocutors are often engaged in, to
name but a few, linguistic alignment (Pickering and Gar-
rod, 2004), responsive back-channeling (Yngve, 1970),
mimicry (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), or interactional
synchrony (Bernieri and Rosenthal, 1991). These phe-
nomena suggest a state of enhanced coordinations be-
tween interlocutors, which ease the task of exchanging
meaning with highy context-dependent messages, and
which increase social affiliation and rapport between the
interactants (Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990; Lakin
et al., 2003). Current ECAs, however, are for the most
part not capable of such coordinations.
This paper discusses whether these mechanisms can
and should be transferred to ECAs, and how this can
be achieved. It is structured in two parts. The first part
(Sect. 2) analyses relevant social responses and mutual
coordinations in human face-to-face conversation. We
will sort out mechanisms that affect the interactants’ be-
haviors, beliefs, and attitudes. It will be argued that
these mechanisms cannot be treated independently, and
that they can be subsumed under the umbrella term so-
cial resonance (cf. Duncan et al. (2007)). This is to
underline the importance of mutual contingency of the
interactants’ multimodal behaviors, i.e., that the char-
acteristics of the “stimulus” behavior are the same or
nearly the same as one’s own, as well as the real-time
dynamics of this interplay. Resonance also alludes to
the mutual “reinforcement” that can be seen to emerge
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as interactants become increasingly coordinated in their
interactional characteristics. When being in social res-
onance, speakers may feel in line and experience their
interaction to run smoothly. In this respect, social reso-
nance relates to one component of rapport, defined by
Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal (1990) as the feeling of
a harmonious or sympathetic connection that interlocu-
tors have when they experience mutual attentiveness,
positivity, and coordination. The present paper con-
tributes a systematic analysis of the range and mecha-
nisms of mutual coordination that facilitate conversation
as such, and help bringing about rapport in it.
The second part of this paper deals with the role and
importance of social resonance for human-agent inter-
action. In Section 3, we will discuss why the respective
coordination mechanisms should be modeled in ECAs
and review experiences from existing systems. It will
be argued that a major, yet missing step in this direction
is to endow agents with an embodied basis for social
resonance – flexible models for producing and under-
standing expressive conversational behavior that ground
in and, crucially, are closely coupled through sensori-
motor structures. In Section 4 we present work in this
direction with a focus on coverbal gestures, and we dis-
cuss how this makes ECAs able to engage with their
users in coordinations only possible in socially resonant
face-to-face communication.
2. Social resonance in human conversation
The concept of social resonance in face-to-face inter-
action embraces a number of phenomema and aims to
point up a principled connection between them. What
all these have in common is that (1) they are interac-
tively contingent, i.e. their occurrence is directly linked
to the interactional context including the partner, (2)
they act in a coordinative fashion between interactants,
and (3) their occurence correlates with the communica-
tive success, e.g., fewer misunderstandings, faster goal
attainment, less effort in relation to gain, as well as the
social success of an interaction, e.g., affiliation, proso-
cial behavior, likelihood of interacting again. We briefly
review those phenomena here.
2.1. Mutual coordinations in natural conversation
Coordinative patterns in natural face-to-face conver-
sation have been described in literature with a lot of dif-
ferent, often overlapping terms. In order to disentangle
the relevant phenomena, we discriminate between three
types that yield coordination of different levels of struc-
ture and are likely to operate on different time scales and
levels of awareness:
• Behavior coordination lets interactants assimilate
their behaviors in form, content or timing;
• Belief coordination leads to compatible knowledge
about specific topics, tasks, or each other;
• Attitude coordination regulates the individual’s
stances toward each other or external objects.
Due to the often vague definitions of the considered phe-
nomena, such an ordering can only be coarse and is
not always clear-cut nor unambiguous (Wallbott, 1995).
Yet it helps to structure the many intricate mutualities at
work in natural conversation, to access their underlying
processes, and to inform modeling attempts in ECAs as
we shall see later on.
Starting with behavior coordination mechanisms, so-
cial resonance resides in dialogic exchanges and thus
comprises coordinative patterns in linguistic behavior.
Giles and Coupland (1991) proposed in their “speech
accommodation theory” that individuals try to gain
sympathy from their interaction partner by converging,
i.e., adapting to each other with respect to their forms
or styles of speech. Such convergence has been found,
e.g., in dialect, non-verbal behaviors, vocal intensity,
prosody, speech rate, phrase duration, or pause length.
Pickering and Garrod (2004) noted that speakers in di-
alog tend to converge on the same expressions, words,
phrase structures, etc., and that this allows them to con-
verse with ease and efficiency. They ascribe this “align-
ment” effect to an automatic “priming” of the interlocu-
tors’ lexical, semantic, and syntactic representations, as
well as situation models. However, alignment has also
been found to be partner-specific (Brennan and Clark,
1996) and thus can be tied also to social functions or ex-
plicit audience design efforts (see Branigan et al. (2009)
for a recent review).
On a broader note, the term “interpersonal coordina-
tion” (Bernieri and Rosenthal, 1991) was used to index
behavioral adaptations that occur in natural interaction.
Nonverbal aspects of this coordination have also been
termed “congruence” (Scheflen, 1964; Kendon, 1973),
including identical or similar body postures and syn-
chronized switches of body posture or position. In gen-
eral, behavioral coordination can be refined into “behav-
ior matching” and “interactional synchrony”. Behavior
matching refers to the similarity of the behaviors of in-
teraction partners and has been referred to as “congru-
ence”, “contingent feedback”, “mimicry” (Lakin et al.,
2003), or “chameleon effect” (Chartrand and Bargh,
1999). Such a matching has been reported for pos-
ture, body movements, facial expressions, mannerisms,
verbal complexity, voice loudness, and numerous other
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behaviors of the interaction partner. Automatic, non-
conscious mimicry has been suggested to act as “social
glue” (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Lakin et al., 2003)
and to build similarity, which ‘tends to breed sympa-
thy’ Wallbott (1995, p.93). A similar effect has been
reported for interactional synchrony (Miles et al., 2009;
Bernieri et al., 1994), which refers to the temporal co-
ordination between interactants (also called “entrain-
ment”). Such temporal coordination was found, e.g., in
body sway or changes of movement and posture (Con-
don and Ogston, 1960). Often, this synchronization falls
into rhythmic patterns, and it can remarkably be medi-
ated by acoustic signals alone (Shockley et al., 2003).
Turning to the realm of beliefs, we first note that com-
munication per se is about coordinating the beliefs of
interlocutors. We indicate, signal, or display meaning
in order for a recipient to understand and share our be-
liefs and goals, and to respond as intended (Allwood
et al., 1992). This belief coordination, in conversation,
is a highly dynamic process which has been viewed
as demonstrated collaboration or joint action (Clark,
1996): partners coordinate actions in real-time in or-
der to build common ground and achieve a joint task.
Mechanisms to enable such cooperative dialog behavior
includes “back-channel feedback”, by which listeners
disclose to speakers their ability and willingness to per-
ceive or understand (Allwood et al., 1992), or demon-
strated “grounding” acts by which recipients acknowl-
edge and accept newly presented information (Traum
and Allen, 1992). Socially resonant speakers are re-
sponsive to such feedback while formulating their next
contribution (Brennan and Clark, 1996).
Although belief coordination does not necessarily re-
quire behavior coordination, it is revealing that the two
often go together. The alignment account by Pickering
and Garrod (2004) explicitely states that coordinated be-
havioral forms precede (by way of priming) coordinated
semantic representations. Further, behavior matching
can assume a communicative function when it applies
to communicative signs. For example, gestural mimicry
(Kimbara, 2005), understood as the recurrence of gestu-
ral features across speakers, contributes to grounding as
it refers by same gestural forms to the same previously
established entities. Fig. 1 illustrates one example of
gestural mimicry taken from a study on direction-giving
dyads (Bergmann and Kopp, 2009b). Here, the recipient
demonstrates understanding, i.e., successful belief co-
ordination, by exemplifying it with a different, yet suf-
ficiently similar gesture that mimicks the shape of the
original referent.
Finally, there is a level at which interactants try to
coordinate their attitudes towards each other, as well
"Okay""Uhm, a u-shaped building"
Figure 1: Example of gestural mimicry in natural conversation.
as the current task goals. For example, speakers who
are cooperative will want the others, first, to notice this
and, second, to take a similar stance towards their joint
project (the conversation itself and maybe also some ex-
ternal task). While a general discussion of this is be-
yond the scope of this paper, we note that dialog of-
ten contains stretches that primarily emphasize social
goals; cf. (Bickmore, 2003). “Social dialog frames” can
comprise joke-telling, getting acquainted talk, or small
talk, and set the stage for attitudinal coordination mech-
anisms like showing agreement and reciprocal appreci-
ation in order to build solidarity, familiarity, or rapport.
2.2. Coordination and social resonance
The previously reviewed phenomena demonstrate
that humans in face-to-face communication engage in
mutual coordination of (at least) their behaviors, beliefs,
and attitudes. The question is: how do those coordi-
nations lead to social resonance between interactants?
First of all, it is important to note that coordinations oc-
cur frequently and ubiquitously, but not inevitably and
not always to the same degree. As Wallbott (1995) put
it, dialogical exchange consists of an complex interplay
of mutualities and non-mutualities of the interaction
partners. Dialog evolves upon a basis of coordinated
(grounded) behaviors and beliefs, but is at the same time
propelled forward by the nonconformances of the inter-
locutors. Further, socio-cultural norms, situational de-
mands, or the relationship between two interactants im-
ply boundaries of ‘too-much’ similarity and mutuality.
For example when explicitely detected, high degrees of
convergence can backfire and make people feel patron-
ized or uncomfortable Giles (1980). Nevertheless, inter-
locutors are often found to coordinate themselves with
each other more than necessary. Social resonance refers
to this very quality of an interaction.
It is also important to note that the different coor-
dination mechanisms are not separate, but go hand in
hand (see Fig. 2): belief coordination facilitates attitude
coordination as feedback and common ground are pre-
requisites for establishing familiarity, trust, and rapport.
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Figure 2: Social resonance exceeds mere information exchange by mutual coordination of behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes.
The other way around, a positive relationship changes
belief coordination devices (Cassell et al., 2007) and
fosters task collaboration (Bickmore, 2003). Behavior
coordination, in turn, is tied to attitude coordination as
mimicry and synchrony correlate with affiliation (Lakin
et al., 2003), rapport (Miles et al., 2009), and impression
management (Uldall et al., 2003). Finally, behavior co-
ordination and belief coordination are linked as aligned
communicative behavior reflects shared mental repre-
sentations and thus common ground (Pickering and Gar-
rod, 2004; Kimbara, 2005). In sum, it is the coordinated
interplay of the three kinds of coordination which cre-
ates social resonance, each one alone is insufficient. It
comes about when speakers are able and willing to be
sensitive to and resonate with others on all levels, in
support of the interaction and in appreciation of the in-
terlocutor. The resulting state of behavioral and mental
alignment, then, is a main ingredient for the feeling of
rapport (Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990).
One reason that not all interactions nor all speakers
are equally amenable to mutual coordinations may lie
in differences in the individual’s “interpersonal sensi-
tivity” as well as differences in the cooperative and so-
cial nature of the activity (Miles et al., 2009; Tickle-
Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990). Interpersonal sensitivity
(Hall and Bernieri, 2001) is the ability to accurately as-
sess other’s abilities, emotional states, and traits from
nonverbal cues. Even stronger notions like “empathy”
or “emotional contagion” (Hsee et al., 1990) refer to an
automatic tendency to mimic another persons emotional
experience/expression, and thus to experience/express
the same emotions oneself. These capabilities are ba-
sic prerequisites for being socially resonant. They are
fundamentally rooted in a sensorimotor basis in which
fast perception-action links like the human mirror sys-
tem actively involve the own motor system in the per-
ception of other’s actions (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Wilson
and Knoblich, 2005). The resulting “motor resonances”
are assumed to underlie behaviors where an individual
reproduces, overtly or internally, movements or actions
made by another individual. In humans, those reso-
nances have been robustly found for social (not object-
directed) behavior (Bertenthal et al., 2006; Montgomery
et al., 2007) and this may directly mediate behavior
coordinations like mimicry or synchrony. In addition,
such processes are involved in empathy and social un-
derstanding of others (Gallese et al., 2004), thus reach-
ing into levels of language and social cognition that can
mediate the coordination of beliefs and attitudes. Our
analysis of the co-occurrence of coordinations, then,
suggests that these levels are linked in both directions
(bottom-up and top-down) and that these links are par-
ticularly effective in socially resonant interactions.
3. Social resonance in human-agent interaction
The previous section analyzed social resonance in
face-to-face communication between humans. Now we
turn to conversations between humans and embodied ar-
tificial systems. Endowing ECAs with capabilities of
social resonance has increasingly started to move into
focus of researchers. Here we review findings indicating
that such a quality is actually relevant for human-agent
interaction, and we discuss whether agents need to be
coordinating with users themselves. We will thereby
also review current approaches to social coordinations
in interactive technical systems.
3.1. Why is it relevant?
In human communication, mutual coordinations ease
the task of communicating for the interlocutors (com-
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municative and cognitive functions) and contribute to
socially desirable outcomes of the interaction (social
function). Of course, tenants of human-human inter-
actions do not directly translate in human-agent inter-
actions, due to the simplifications and approximations
inevitably adopted in agents. However, solid evidence
suggests that humans have a propensity to treat agents as
social actors and to apply human communication strate-
gies towards them, albeit aware of their machine nature
(Reeves and Nass, 1996; Kopp et al., 2005; Kra¨mer,
2008). Correspondingly, humans show behavior coor-
dination effects towards machines. For example, speak-
ers have been reported to align their speech rate, am-
plitude and pause structure, prosodic contour, or contri-
bution length to computers that speak with a synthetic
voice. Alignment is also found in lexical choice as well
as syntactic structures (see Branigan et al. (2009) for an
excellent overview).
Remarkably, alignment of human users with comput-
ers has been found to be similar or even stronger than in
human-human communication. Branigan et al. (2009)
conclude that alignment with artificial interlocutors is
motivated less by social components than by consid-
erations of communicative success, which encompass
beliefs about the computer’s limited capabilities. The
fact, however, that we also find behavior coordination
of rather low features, activated by mere exposure to
a computer’s verbal and nonverbal behavior, speaks to
the effectivity of multiple components of coordination
(automatic vs. strategic, behaviors vs. beliefs). This
effect is likely to be stronger in face-to-face conversa-
tion with embodied agents, which are known to induce
social effects. Indeed, presenting humans with a suffi-
ciently human-like agent activates our basic sensorimo-
tor mechanisms of social interaction (e.g., Press et al.
(2006)) and ECAs may well be able to invoke mimicry
or alignment on the part of the human. In sum, social
resonance can be an effective phenomenon with ECAs
to some extent, and human users readily exhibit differ-
ent coordination mechanisms towards machines.
3.2. Why building resonant ECAs?
In principle, socially resonant behavior is a hallmark
of natural conversation and it seems natural to work to-
wards their inclusion in ECAs. For example, it is obvi-
ous that those dynamic mechanisms that help interlocu-
tors coordinate their beliefs (e.g., back-channel feed-
back or gestural mimicry) can be of great value for con-
versational artifacts, especially given their limited capa-
bilities, which users cannot readily assess. Further, a
growing body of studies indicate that behavior coordi-
nations on the part of the agent may be advantageous:
users rate systems more positive, believable, or persua-
sive when they align with them. This has been reported,
e.g., for speech rate, synthesized voices, or head move-
ments (Bailenson et al., 2008). Branigan et al. (2009,
p.12) hold that “just as alignment by a human interlocu-
tor causes people to rate that interlocutor more posi-
tively, then, so alignment by a computer induces positive
affect towards the computer”. This conforms the role
of social resonance in rapport-building also for agents.
That is, when we want agents to be able to build rap-
port with their users, contingent behavior becomes cru-
cial. Gratch et al. (2006) found that a story-listening
agent that performs head nods and postural mirroring
increases instant user rapport and comforts users with
social anxiety (Kang et al., 2008).
Further research in humans has also shown that not
being resonant (in the sense of not being imitative and
adaptive) can be taken as indicator of social distance and
interaction problems, can lower self-esteem in interac-
tion partners (Lakin et al., 2008), or can use up their
cognitive resources (Finkel et al., 2006). The latter con-
forms the hypothesis (Pickering and Garrod, 2004) that
behavioral alignment is largely resource-free and even
a default for human cognitive processing (due to, e.g.,
priming effects). Agents that are resonant may well be
able to support this cognitive trait. Finally, work on “re-
lational agents” (Cassell and Bickmore, 2001; Stronks
et al., 2002) has utilized deliberate attitude coordination,
e.g., through avoiding face threads or conducting social
dialog. Again, results indicate that this can have posi-
tive effects on the interaction with users (Bickmore and
Schulman, 2006; Bickmore, 2003).
Overall, we are led to believe that making agents
socially resonant can bear several improvements of
human-agent interaction. However, whether and in
which scenarios exactly human users would value and
benefit from resonant agents is an open research ques-
tion. Research in this direction is needed and important,
for it will help our understanding of how HCI works,
how robust naturalistic systems can be developed, and
what potential limits of human-agent interaction are.
Hence we move on to present actual work in this di-
rection. Unlike others, who target long-term coordina-
tions (Cassell and Bickmore, 2001; Bickmore, 2003),
we work bottom-up and start with the short-term com-
ponents of social resonance, i.e., the behavior and be-
lief coordinations that become visible in effects like the
gestural mimicry shown in Fig. 1, and which can fa-
cilitate communication right from the start. Such low-
level mechanisms are likely to rest upon, and partly may
even result from, the involvement of sensorimotor com-
ponents in perceiving, processing, and producing socio-
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communicative behavior. For example, the automatic
sensorimotor activations discussed in Sect. 2.2 can di-
rectly provide a basis (1) for non-consciuous mimicry,
when leaking through to motor execution; (2) for under-
standing the meaning and intentions behind a behavior,
when perculating up into higher levels of representing
mental states; (3) for alignment, when leaving traces
that affect the recruitment of those structures in subse-
quent behavior production. The next section presents
work to enable such embodied coordinations in ECAs.
4. Modeling embodied coordination for ECAs
We start out building socially resonant ECAs by mod-
eling for them embodied coordination of social behav-
ior. This involves three tasks: First, modeling fast and
incremental perception of another agent’s behavior and
its grounding in experiences and action of ones own.
Second, building flexible generation models for conver-
sational behavior that are so adjustable and versatile as
to enable fine coordination of linguistic and nonverbal
behavior. The former runs mainly bottom-up, from con-
currently activated sensorimotor structures to hypothe-
ses about intended interpretations and appropriate re-
sponses; the latter is to work primarily top-down, driven
by communicative intent and mapping into communica-
tive acts in a context-sensitive fashion. Finally, both
kinds of processes need to be fused in perception-action
structures that can mediate inter-personal coordination.
Here we present work that addresses these issues for
coverbal gesture.
4.1. Bottom-up gesture perception
Seeing somebody gesturing shall create resonances
in the agent’s motor system, which then enable the
agent to imitate the observed movement overtly or in-
ternally. We devised a hierarchical sensorimotor system
that spans from kinematic movement features to com-
plex motor structures, and reaches into higher levels of
goals and intentions (Sadeghipour and Kopp, 2009). In
this view top-down motor control is seen as refinement
of commands, from an abstract goal to more detailed
motor acts to precise specifications of muscle activa-
tions (Hamilton and Grafton, 2008). When perceiving
others’ social behaviors, activation originates in motor
processes and flows bottom-up (Gallese et al., 2004)
while being susceptible to top-down modulation, as sug-
gested by the selectivity of mimicry (Lakin et al. 2003).
Our resonance-based gesture perception model is
shown in Fig. 3. It is built atop a computational model
of gesture motor control for humanoid agents, part of
the “Articulated Communicator Engine” (ACE; Kopp
and Wachsmuth (2004)). This motor control module
provides means of representing a gesture as a compos-
ite of spatio-temporal goals, e.g., handshape, orienta-
tion of the wrist, or trajectory of the arm movement.
These features constitute the lowest level of description
of a movement, in terms of the agent’s own motor com-
mands. Above this level, we differentiate between three
levels of sensorimotor representation: basic motor com-
mands (MC), motor programs (MP), and complex mo-
tor schemas (MS); see (Sadeghipour and Kopp, 2009)
for detailed descriptions. At the motor command level,
movement is represented as a path through a graph, in
which nodes denote states of the agent’s body and motor
system, and edges represent motor commands that cause
this system to transition from one configuration into an-
other. Motor programs, at the next level (cf. Fig. 3), are
timed paths in the motor command graph. Both struc-
tures are present for the left and right hand and arm, re-
spectively. At the top-most level, a motor schema sub-
sumes different motor programs for variants of, say, a
waving gesture (e.g., one for waving left at shoulder
height and with two large repetitions, and another one
for waving right at chest level with three reciprocating
movements).
The hierarchical motor structures are the basis on
which probabilistic processes of recognizing, imitating,
and predicting the behavior of others operate: Visual in-
put of an observed movement is continuously fed into
a working memory. Forward models make probabilis-
tic predictions of the possible continuation of the move-
ment if it were a specific motor unit (command, pro-
gram, or schema). Bayesian evaluation against the ac-
tual movement yields conditional probabilities for dif-
ferent motor commands. A Bayesian network models
the cross-level activation along probabilistic relation-
ships between the components of different levels. In
result, conditional probabilities, interpreted here as de-
grees of certainty, perculate bottom-up from motor com-
mands to programs and on to schemas. At the same
time, activations at higher levels yield predictions that
flow top-down and increase/decrease the prior probabil-
ities of lower level candidate structures. In result, as the
agent is observing a gesture, resonances come about on
all levels in parallel. Fig. 4 illustrates this for an exam-
ple waving gesture (from motion capture data).
Fig. 5 shows an example from a simulation with two
virtual humans, one being the demonstrator of a gesture
and the other being the “resonator”, whose correspond-
ing own motor program gets activated almost simultane-
ously and allows imitating the gesture along. This ex-
ample also demonstrates that the gesture is reproduced
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Figure 3: Resonance-based model of bottom-up gesture perception; see text for explanations.
lateralized since, in this case, handedness was consid-
ered a significant and potentially meaningful feature (by
the motor schema). Thus it needed to be reproduced
to demonstrate successful belief coordination, accom-
panied by an embodied behavior coordination (showing
I know what you mean, I have a similar gestural repre-
sentation of it, and I know how it feels like). In this sense
gestural mimicry differs from simple mirroring (cf. the
example in Fig. 1). This also shows how resonance can
arise through mimicry or imitation by indicating shared
efficiencies and experiences (Bertenthal et al., 2006).
Thus, gestural mimicry has an auxiliary social function
in addition to its grounding function. The actually per-
formed contingent gesture, then, is the result of both
coordination mechanisms.
Our gesture perception model can simulate for arbi-
trary social behaviors how motor resonances incremen-
tally emerge, how mimicry comes about, and how acti-
vation spreads up into levels of complex, decontextual-
ized motor schemas. But how can this lead to coordina-
tion effects in an agent’s communicative behavior?
4.2. Top-down speech and gesture generation
The second cornerstone of socially resonant ECAs
is highly flexible behavior generation. Gestures have
been shown to vary in size, redundancy with speech, or
complexity, depending on the grounding status of the
information encoded or the meaning-form pairings em-
ployed (Kimbara, 2005). When looking at continued
interaction in which social resonance should emerge,
gestures play an important role as they indicate engage-
ment, draw attention, and convey information about the
speaker’s mental state not present in speech. This holds
especially for iconic gestures that create depictions of
objects or events in space (McNeill, 1992), thus ac-
companying verbal descriptions with imagistic informa-
tion. Gestural coordination thus can have many possible
functions, from demonstrating engagement to building
positive affect, to confirming successful coordination of
perceptual mental states and their grounding in shared
sensorimotor experiences.
Only a full-blown production model that comprises
rich multimodal knowledge structures, embedded in
discourse, and can turn selected parts of them into coor-
dinated words and gestures would provide the flexibil-
ity needed for all these coordinations. We thus devised
a generation model, outlined in Fig. 6(a), that imple-
ments the main stages of deriving words and gestures,
as well as the presumed interactions between the two
modes of expressiveness along these stages (Bergmann
and Kopp, 2009b). The major steps are content planning
(i.e., figuring out what to convey), behavior formulation
(i.e., figuring out how to convey it best), and realization
(i.e., conveying it). Each step is realized in a modality-
specific way: in the speech branch, a Message Gener-
ator draws upon a propositional knowledge representa-
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Figure 5: Left: one interlocutor (left) performs a simple hand-raising gesture, the observer (right) has immediate motor resonances and imitates
simultanesously; middle: motor-level intentions were successfully reproduced; right: demonstration continues but the movement is new to the
observer who returns to a rest position for learning.
tion and selects facts that a Speech Formulator turns into
linguistic utterances, which are then synthesized us-
ing our realization engine ACE (Kopp and Wachsmuth,
2004). For gesture, an Image Generator operates upon
a simulated visuo-spatial imagery (Imagistic Descrip-
tion Trees (IDT); Sowa and Wachsmuth (2005)) and re-
alizes, e.g., spatial perspective taking. Speech and ges-
ture generation interact at the level of semantic repre-
sentation via multimodal concepts, creating bindings of
IDTs with corresponding propositional formulations.
In recent work, we have demonstrated that this flex-
ible generation model can be used to simulate verbal
lexical alignment (Buschmeier et al., 2009). Of partic-
ular importance here is the Gesture Formulator, which
is to find gestural depictions of selected parts of visuo-
spatial imagery. To this end, it is not restricted to a fixed
set of self-contained gestures, but constructs them on
the fly from single morphological features (handshape,
wrist location, palm direction, extended finger direction,
movement trajectory and direction) using a Bayesian
decision network as shown in Fig. 7 (Bergmann and
Kopp, 2009a). The network was learned from a large
corpus of speech and gesture behavior in direction-
giving (25 dyads; about 5000 gestures). In these data we
found situational factors like referent shape or speech
Gesture?
yes
no
private
shared
Indexing
Placing
Shaping
Drawing
Posturing
Representation 
Technique?
ASL-G
ASL-B
ASL-5
ASL-O
ASL-C
Handshape?
theme
rheme
Inform. Structure
Intro
DescrFeatures
DescrConstr
Position
Communicative 
Action
Information State
0
1
Symmetrical Axes
0
1
Childnodes
Orientation?Position/Movement?
(Mapping rule) (Mapping rule)
Figure 7: Bayesian decision network for gesture formulation.
act type to have a systematic impact on the overall ges-
ture representation technique employed (shaping, draw-
ing, posturing, placing or pointing). On the other hand,
there are significant individual differences in whether
people make a gesture at all or which gesture features
they prefer. The decision network allows us to model
these probabilistic dependencies learnt from speaker
data, and to combine them in a unified manner with
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(b)
Figure 6: (a) Schematic of the generation model for speech and iconic gesture; (b) exampe utterances produced with it.
decision nodes for features that must be derived in a
model-based way to ensure iconicity of the gesture (e.g.,
position and orientation). Fig. 6(b) shows example
utterances produced with the virtual human Max, au-
tonomously generated by our model from simple com-
municative goals like “describe churchtower-1 roof-3”.
4.3. Fusing perception and generation
The final step is to fuse the previous two models
such that perception-induced motor resonances can af-
fect behavior production. This is part of an ongoing
research program and, here, we discuss the straight-
forward approach to this, namely, to ground gesture pro-
duction in the sensorimotor structures of the perception
model. This means to connect the productive rule-based
Gesture Formulator, which was built to compose new
gestures from scratch, with a more exemplar-based ap-
proach that rests upon previously experienced and learnt
own motor patterns. More precisely, we propose to con-
nect the Bayesian network that models the probabilis-
tic dependencies and choices in deciding gesture form,
with the probabilistic network of motor schemas and
motor programs as follows.
Gesture generation utilizes a network that associates
pragmatic and semantic aspects with features of a ges-
ture like representation technique, handedness, hand
shape or position, and possibly also schematized feature
combinations (e.g., moving along a certain trajectory
while holding the hand orthogonal to the direction of
movement). The according decision nodes, now, need to
connect to motor structures and formulate probabilities
over these value sets, and the levels of motor schemas
and motor programs seem to be well suited for this: mo-
tor schemas can be associated with complete gestures or
iconic representation techniques, motor programs with
certain morphological features. That way, motor struc-
tures also come to be endowed with a “semantic poten-
tial”. The model-based decision nodes can be extended
to work bi-directionally, which we reckon to be possi-
ble since inverted forms of the mapping rules have been
applied in earlier work on gesture interpretation (Sowa
and Wachsmuth, 2005). Finally, the network can easily
be made dynamical be altering probabilities temporarily
and let them slowly return to long-term distributions.
This approach has several advantages. First,
Bayesian networks allow for both predictive and diag-
nostic inferences. The combined model can thus be
used for incrementally inferring the likely interpreta-
tions of a gesture or, more precisely, the motor reso-
nances it evokes. Interpretations thereby automatically
arrive at all variables modeled in the network, includ-
ing imagistic meaning, information structure and speech
act type, or the spatial perspective taken. Second, the
network dynamics allows for modeling preactivations
over feature values, which is needed to simulate align-
ment. This is easily achieved by adjusting a priori dis-
tributions and incorporating them in the Bayesian di-
agnostic and predictive inferences, as well as the de-
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cision nodes. Finally, the resultant network structure
will connect meaning-based structures with form-based
structures, and it will thus allow seamless resonance-
spreading across them. This is crucial as we find in our
gesture data that behavior coordination and belief coor-
dination intermingle (as in the example in Fig. 1). Fi-
nally, in an integrated model as proposed here, in which
imagistic meaning interfaces with language semantics,
this can even extend into supramodal effects, e.g., when
perceiving a gesture lets the agent use different, seman-
tically coordinated language.
4.4. Example
To illustrate how the fused model would work, we
give an example of how an agent can dynamically co-
ordinate behavior and beliefs with a user. The sim-
plest case is that the agent, in conversation with a hu-
man user, receives a user’s utterance like “please give
me the plate” including a static iconic gesture adding
to speech complementary information about the plate’s
shape. As described above, bottom-up gesture percep-
tion directly leads to fast probability distributions in the
Bayesian gesture generation network, as to the likely in-
terpretation of this gesture (e.g., that it refers to a round-
like referent that is new to the discourse). This allows,
first, for fast affirmative feedback (e.g. head nod) and,
second, for further reasoning that in this case might re-
sult, e.g., in a communicative goal “confirm give plate-
2”. From this, the generation model produces an ut-
terance “ok the round one”, accompanied by a gesture
that is, thanks to shifted probability distributions, simi-
lar to the user’s gesture, i.e., static modeling as opposed
to dynamic circle-drawing, which the model could have
come up with as well. Note that a different gesture by
the user, or the absence of it, would have caused the
agent automatically to behave differently. In result the
user experiences an agent that is engaged and respon-
sive (gives fast feedback), shares the same gesture motor
repertoire, is collaborative (demonstrates this personal
common ground), and aligns (gesture mimicry).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Natural face-to-face conversation is characterized by
qualities beyond the discrete exchange of clear-cut mes-
sages. A theoretical analysis has revealed numerous
ways in which interlocutors coordinate their behaviors,
beliefs, and attitudes. These mechanisms serve commu-
nicative, cognitive, and social functions, and this points
us to the fact that we need to pay more attention to
socio-communicative factors in ECA design. It is not
claimed here that human-agent communication can or
should be made identical to human-human encounters,
especially with regard to social aspects. Neither it is
claimed that agents can engage in full-blown social re-
lationshiphs with humans. What we argue, however,
is that mechanisms like mimicry, alignment, and syn-
chrony are essential coordination devices in face-to-face
conversation, and that it may be a significant improve-
ment of human-agent interaction to also impart those
mechanisms to embodied conversational artifacts. En-
abling such mechanisms for human-machine interaction
may probably be one asset of ECA-based interfaces.
Endowing machines, agents or robots, with better ca-
pabilities for social interaction has been a goal of re-
searchers for quite some time. Current virtual agents, as
partly discussed in Sect. 3, have focused either on es-
tablishing and maintaining relationships with users over
time, or have looked at instant rapport. The latter sys-
tems share with the present work a focus on short-term
contingencies and coordination. However, no work has
tried so far to develop deep generation and perception
models for conversational speech-gesture behavior, and
to integrate them based on tenets of embodied coordina-
tion. Previous approaches to iconic gesture generation,
e.g. (Cassell et al., 2000a; Kopp et al., 2004), employed
predefined lexicons and do not explicate gesture seman-
tics, such that they lack sufficient flexibility to achieve
viable behavior and belief coordination.
Likewise, classical approaches to gesture percep-
tion rely on pattern classification. In recent times, a
growing body of work in social robotics is directed
to robots capable of rich social interactions with hu-
mans. This includes movement perception for imita-
tion based on partially shared sensory and motor repre-
sentations (Amit and Mataric, 2002; Shon et al., 2007).
Billard (2002) employed imitation in a robot in order
to create a shared perceptual context for learning signs.
(Breazeal et al., 2005) have proposed a full simulation-
theoretic architecture with integrated perception-action
structures, based on which a robot acquires social be-
havior and then infers ‘empathetic’ affective states or
beliefs of the human with whom it interacts. The work
presented here is inspired by this approach and exceeds
it in two respects: first, we target the perception and
generation of complex communicative signs including
speech and iconic gesture; second, the perception model
presented here allows for incremental processing and
fast, contingent behavior. Work like Breazeal et al.
(2005)’s point the way toward using imitation and em-
pathy as a means of social learning, grounding behavior
perception and action in an actual physical body, and
boot-strapping representational aspect of a Theory of
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Mind that captures commonalities as well as differences
between an agent’s own states and the states of others.
But what is missing yet, are sufficiently powerful mod-
els of communicative robot behavior, such that a robot
could actually engage with a human user in coordinating
beliefs and behaviors at eye level. Our work explores
this direction in the realm of speech and gesture for vir-
tual agents. Our models have provided very promising
results so far, and we are confident that their integration
as presented and discussed here will elevate the inter-
action abilities of artificial interlocutors to a new level,
at which contingent behavior is not coincidental but an
earmark of socially resonant human-agent interactions.
This will then enable first opportunities for thorough
empirical testing of social resonance with ECAs, and
the possibilities and limits of human-agent interaction
more generally.
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